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ABSTRACT
We present a novel framework for decentralised coalition for-
mation in social networks, where agents can form coalitions
through bilateral negotiations with their neighbours. Specif-
ically, we present a practical negotiation protocol and deci-
sion functions that enable agents to form coalitions with
agents beyond their peers. Building on this, we establish
baseline negotiation strategies which we empirically show
to be eﬃcient (agreements are reached in few negotiation
rounds) and eﬀective (agreements have high utility com-
pared to a centralised approach) on a variety of network
topologies. Moreover, we show that the average degree of
social networks can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the performance of
these strategies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Coalition formation (CF) is one of the fundamental approaches
in multi-agent systems for establishing collaboration between
groups or networks of self-interested agents. Traditionally,
CF has been studied in terms of its algorithmics and eco-
nomics [13]. For example, while [13] introduced algorithms
to form the best coalitions from a set of agents, [3] study
how to divide payoﬀs obtained as a result of coalitional ac-
tions. However, existing solutions tend to be centralised
and (or) not scalable (dealing with < 30 agents), and typi-
cally assume that agents are cooperative and (or) have com-
plete access to the information about other agents’ pref-
erences. Hence, such solutions are not readily applicable
to problems involving large numbers of self-interested (i.e.,
individual utility maximising) agents that are ignorant of
their neighbours’ preferences. In turn, in the economics lit-
erature, studies of CF with self-interested agents are typi-
cally focused on determining equilibrium outcomes (based
on some allocation rules imposed on the population or net-
work of agents) of the game rather than on the reasoning
that each individual agent has to perform (in the absence
of information about other agents’ payoﬀs) to come to such
equilibrium outcomes [6]. In short, most existing approaches
ignore the practical process by which large numbers of self-
interested autonomous agents can form coalitions in a fully
decentralised manner and decide on the divisions of pay-
oﬀ without complete information. Crucially, there exists no
framework to regiment the communication and negotiation
interactions that agents need to engage in to form coalitions
in such situations.
To address this shortcoming, in this paper we develop the
ﬁrst decentralised coalition formation (DCF) framework that
allows agents to form coalitions through negotiation in a
completely decentralised manner, and without knowing other
agents’ preferences. In so doing, we further assume that
agents are connected through a social network, where inter-
actions can only occur between neighbours in the network.
This is common in markets, for example, where an agent
may only form groups with those agents it knows or trusts
[6].
In more detail, this paper advances the state of the art
as follows. First, we propose a novel bargaining protocol
whereby agents can reach agreements on which coalitions to
form, which coalitional actions to execute, and how to di-
vide the resulting surplus. While agents can only negotiate
with their neighbours, this protocol ensures that coalitions
can be formed across the network and negotiations do not
result in deadlocks. Second, we devise novel negotiation
decision functions that eﬀectively exploit the network struc-
ture and build on heuristic negotiation techniques that have
been designed for two-agent negotiations [7, 12]. We use
these techniques because they have been shown to be eﬀec-
tive in practical conﬂict settings where there is limited or no
access to statistical models of agents’ preferences. Third, we
empirically evaluate the system (involving a hundred agents)
and establish negotiation eﬃciency benchmarks for DCF on
three types of social networks. In so doing, we show how
the new negotiation strategy we propose can improve social
welfare by up to 10% (compared to a baseline) and how the
average degree of the network can signiﬁcantly constrain or
enlarge the negotiation space, hence impacting the sizes of
coalitions formed and the payoﬀs of the agents. Taken al-
together, our results provide new insights on practical DCF
within large scale systems and open up several new areas of
research in the area of DCF.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2discusses relevant literature building upon which Section 3
deﬁnes the model involving the social network, the negoti-
ation protocols, and the oﬀers exchanged. Then, Section 4
deﬁnes the negotiation decision functions that include the
negotiation strategy of an agent. Section 5 empirically eval-
uates the performance of the DCF process and Section 6
concludes.
2. RELATED WORK
Our approach to coalition formation is inspired from the
seminal work of Myerson (summarised in [9]), who argued
agents will form coalitions through some negotiation process
where they are assumed to be able to compute the exact pay-
oﬀ they should get in their respective coalitions. Following
on from this, a number of works have addressed the pay-
oﬀ distribution problem among self-interested agents [9, 2,
14, 11]. While these approaches present interesting stabil-
ity concepts (i.e., payments to agents and assignments to
coalitions) they do not consider the negotiation process that
happens for the agents to reach such outcomes when the
agents have no information about other agents’ preferences
or cannot communicate with every other agent in the sys-
tem.
The problem where coalitions are constrained by the net-
work which connect the agents (i.e., when agents interact in
a peer-to-peer fashion within a social network) has also been
studied within the network or group formation literature in
the ﬁeld of economics [6, 16, 4]. These approaches consider
a number of bargaining protocols and allocation rules that
allow the formation of coalitions but only study the equilib-
rium properties of such protocols rather than provide the de-
cision functions needed by the agents to come to agreements
as to what coalitions to form. Hence, despite the numerous
possible applications of coalition formation (e.g., grid com-
puting, web services, or sensor networks [5]), existing work
on this topic has remained largely theoretical and applicable
to small systems (typically not larger than 30 agents), and
the process by which coalitions can be formed in practice
is not adequately addressed in the current literature. An
exception is the work by [8], which considers the dynamic
coalition formation problem where agents can create, negoti-
ate, and form new coalitions as and when needed. However,
[8] only introduces a high-level framework for studying such
interactions and this framework is not evaluated, nor does
it provide speciﬁc negotiation protocols or strategies that
agents could use to form coalitions.
Turning to the multi-agent bargaining literature, since the
seminal work of Faratin et al. [7], a number of negotiation
mechanisms have been developed to solve resource alloca-
tion problems in multi-agent systems [12, 15]. While these
constitute robust decentralised mechanisms for conﬂict reso-
lution, none of them have attempted to instantiate the type
of negotiation process needed to form coalitions where both
the actions and the sharing of payoﬀs among the coalition
members need to be agreed upon. Hence, our work aims to
bridge the gap between the bilateral negotiation and coali-
tion formation domains by speciﬁcally developing a set of
negotiation protocols and decision making functions for au-
tomated negotiation for coalition formation.
3. THE MODEL
In this section, we present our model of DCF. Let I =
{1,2,...,|I|} denote the set of agents. Furthermore, let
S = {C1,...,C n} denote a coalition structure (i.e., a par-
tition of I), where Ck ⊆ I, Ck  = ∅ denotes a coalition and
each agent i ∈ I is part of exactly one coalition C ∈ S.T h a t
is, Ck ∩ Cl = ∅ for all Ck,C l ∈ S whenever k  = l,a n d
∪C∈SC = I (e.g., if C is the grand coalition then |S| =1 ) .
Coalitions with only a single agent are called singletons.
Importantly, agents within the same coalition can perform
some joint tasks. Thus, each agent i can perform an atomic
action αi ∈ Di where Di = {α
1
i,α
2
i,...,α
|Di|
i } is the set
of all possible actions for agent i. Then, the agents’ joint
actions in a coalition C is given by αC = ∪i∈Cαi (we omit
brackets around αi for clarity). Furthermore, each agent i
incurs a cost βi(αC) ∈ R
+ for performing a given action,
which depends on the actions taken by other agents in the
coalition and/or the size of the coalition. However, we as-
sume that, ceteris paribus, these costs are non-increasing
with the size of the coalition. Thus, we assume coalitions
typically enable synergies (e.g., agents sharing resources or
services to perform their individual actions). Speciﬁcally,
for an agent i:
βi(αC) ≥ βi(αC ∪ αj) for all j/ ∈ C,αj ∈ Dj (1)
A l s o ,a si ss t a n d a r d ,t h ec o a l i t i o na saw h o l er e c e i v e sa
payoﬀ or value V (αC) for executing the joint actions. The
purpose of the negotiation process is to both generate coali-
tions and for each agent i to vie for a share vi ∈ R
+ of the
coalition payoﬀ, where

i∈C vi = V (αC). Given this, an
agent i has the following utility function, which it tries to
maximise through negotiation:
ui(αC,v i)=vi − βi(αC)( 2 )
We assume that agents’ cost functions are private informa-
tion (i.e., unknown to other agents), while the value func-
tion is common knowledge. Furthermore, as motivated in
Section 1, we assume that not all coalitions are possible due
to constraints that may prevent some agents from directly
negotiating with each other. To this end, in the next section
we discuss how these constraints are modelled.
3.1 The Social Network
Formally, we assume that agents are connected by a network
G =( I,E)w h e r eI is the set of vertices (agents) and E is a
set of undirected edges. For example, an edge   =( 1 ,2) ∈ E
between agents 1 and 2 means that these agents can negoti-
ate and form a coalition together. Note that agents that are
not peers can be part of the same coalition, as long as there
is a path connecting the agents in the coalition.H o w e v e r ,
those agents in the coalition that are not directly connected
cannot directly engage in negotiation, and so an agent with
more peers within the coalition would typically have more
negotiating power to request a larger payoﬀ.
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Figure 1: Simple social networks.
Consider the example social networks in Figure 1. In Figure
1(a), the possible coalitions are {1},{2},{3},{1,2},{1,3},{1,2,3}.
Thus, {2,3} cannot exist because there is no direct link
between 2 and 3 but {1,2,3} can exist because there is acommon node {1}. Similarly, in Figure 1(b), {1,3} and
{2,4} cannot exist. Finally, in the fully connected graph,
Figure 1(c), all subsets are possible. Now, given the social
network, let N(i) be the set of neighbours of i.T h a t i s ,
N(i)={i
 |(i
 ,i) ∈ E,i
   = i}. Now, suppose an agent i in-
vites agent j ∈ N(i) to join a coalition C ⊆ N(i)∪{i}\{j},
to perform action αj in (αC ∪ αj)f o ras h a r evj in V (αC).
From this information agent j can compute its utility (as
per equation (2)) and can then negotiate for a better share
of the payoﬀ v
 
j >v j within the coalition. Note that we as-
sume here that agent i knows the domain of actions Dj of its
neighbour j ∈ N(i) (otherwise, the agents would not know
what to negotiate over). Next, we detail the negotiation
process.
3.2 The Negotiation Protocol
The agents negotiate to form coalitions, establish the joint
actions, and agree on a share of the surplus. This problem is
complex as, in practice, multiple agents can interact simul-
taneously and asynchronously. While related works have
suggested variants of Rubinstein’s bargaining protocol to
achieve similar goals [10, 6], they focus on equilibrium out-
comes and do not consider many practical issues that arise
in designing a system of negotiating agents for DCF (such
as the rules dictating the sequence of exchanges between
agents). To address these, here we identify key desiderata
that a DCF protocol needs to satisfy and deﬁne a novel ne-
gotiation protocol that does indeed meet our desiderata. We
start by deﬁning the oﬀers that agents can propose.
We denote a simple oﬀer from agent i to agent j to join a
coalition C,j / ∈ C as the pair oij =( αC ∪ αj,v j), which
speciﬁes the actions of the agents in the coalition C,t h e
action that agent j should perform, and the share of the
payoﬀ (in absolute terms) received by agent j.S i n c e t h e
proposing agent does not know the utility function of the
other agent (because the costs of all its actions are private
information), we allow agents to send a compound oﬀer, Oij
containing multiple simple oﬀers. For example, agent i may
propose a diﬀerent share for each action αj ∈ Dj.N o t e
that the share vi of i is not revealed in the oﬀer to j but
i privately knows it as well as its cost. Hence, in the rest
of the paper, we note the utility of i in an oﬀer to j as
ˆ ui(oij)=ui(αC ∪ αj, ˆ vi)w h e r eoij =( αC ∪ αj,v j)a n dˆ vi
is the privately known share of i in V (αC ∪ αj). Moreover,
to help in selecting the best agent to send compound oﬀers
to, we overload ˆ ui(·) to compute the maximum utility ob-
tainable from Oij as ˆ ui(Oij)=m a x o∈Oij ˆ ui(o). Now, given
the oﬀer, the receiving agent may decide to propose an of-
fer (i.e., invite an agent), counter-propose an existing oﬀer,
accept, or reject. Thus, agents can take the following illocu-
tionary actions: Propose(Oij), Counter(oji), Accept(oji),
or Reject(). Alternatively, an agent can simply do nothing
or wait to receive a response (we elaborate on this in sec-
tion 4). Note that, when accepting or counter oﬀering, the
agent must specify a (simple) oﬀer (instead of a compound
one) from the set of received oﬀers, oji =( αC,v i) ∈ Oji.
Moreover, the agent can also accept an enhanced oﬀer (see
Section 4.1 for more details), o
 
ji =( α
 
C ,v
 
i)t h a tm e r g e s
other coalitions with C in an attempt to improve i’s payoﬀs
(and as a consequence improves social welfare). To ensure
that the enhanced oﬀer does not make agent j or any other
agent in coalition C\{i} worse oﬀ, it has to satisfy two con-
ditions. First, V (αC ) − v
 
i ≥ V (αC) − vi (i.e., the total
share received by agents in C\{i} cannot decrease). Sec-
ond, αC ⊂ α
 
C  (i.e., it can only add agents and the other
agents’ actions remain the same). Note that, due to the as-
sumption given by equation (1), such an oﬀer guarantees to
be no worse in terms of utility for all agents in C.
Now, the negotiation protocol speciﬁes a number of rules
which agents must follow (and which should be enforced by
the system) to ensure that the oﬀers and agreements that
are made can be honoured, and that no inconsistencies arise
within the network (e.g., where two diﬀerent coalitions share
some agents). To date, however, negotiation protocols have
mainly been designed in order to avoid deadlocks and ensure
termination [12]. But in the DCF domain, we expect the ne-
gotiation protocol to also satisfy the following desiderata: (i)
enable the formation of large coalitions (of size ≥ 2) to try
and improve social welfare by exploiting synergies among
agents, and (ii) minimise the information exchange needed
across the network to try and minimise communication over-
heads (to improve scalability) and the risk of agents losing
their negotiation power (to improve participation in the pro-
cess). For example, if each agent is expected to broadcast
the coalition it would like to form (assuming the network can
handle this) and the individual payoﬀs the members (includ-
ing itself) should get, it risks getting a smaller payoﬀ (than
when contacting peers) since all other agents may strategi-
cally use this information to demand a larger payoﬀ. Hence,
here we present the ﬁrst DCF protocol speciﬁcally designed
to meet all these desiderata:
Rule 1: Oﬀer Commitment. Once an agent i proposes
an oﬀer Oij, and agent j accepts, then i is committed to any
oij =( αC,v j) ∈ Oij and any enhanced oﬀer o
 
ij =( α
 
C,v
 
j)
where αC ⊂ α
 
C and V (αC ) − v
 
i ≥ V (αC) − vi.I fi n s t e a d
the recipient j counter oﬀers (αC,v
 
j)t oi,t h e ni is auto-
matically decommitted from its previous oﬀer. Hence, only
the latest oﬀer between the two agents counts. Moreover, if
agent j rejects i’s oﬀer, i is no longer committed to its oﬀer.
Rule 2: Proposal Consistency.A g e n ti can propose an
oﬀer oij =( αC ∪αj,v j)o n l yi fi has either received an oﬀer
containing αC, or has received oﬀers which, when merged
(to create an enhanced oﬀer as desired), result in αC.T h i s
prevents agents from involving other agents in a coalition
they do not agree to. Note that merging oﬀers is consistent
with rule 1 since agents are committed to these oﬀers.
If oﬀers are allowed to be made by all agents at all times, the
system is not likely to converge to a solution. To guarantee
convergence (e.g., avoid deadlocks and infeasible solutions),
the following rules (graphically illustrated in Figure 2) im-
pose restrictions messages sent the system:
1
Rule 3: Message Sending. All agents start in the Ready
state (see Figure 2). Ready agents can propose an oﬀer
or counter oﬀer, but to a single peer at a time (this limits
communication overheads as desired). Once it has sent the
message, it goes to the Wait state where it waits for a re-
ply (either an accept oﬀer, a counter oﬀer, or a reject) before
sending another message. Furthermore, a waiting agent can-
1Some of these rules are based on those that help achieve
convergence on graphical models [1]. Due to lack of space, a
proof of correctness and termination is not included in this
version of the paper.not receive any messages except from the agent it proposed
the oﬀer to (in practice, this can be achieved by making the
state of the agent public). This rule prevents deadlocks, by
preventing cycles of oﬀers, and conﬂicting coalitions from
being formed (i.e., where one coalition is not a strict subset
of another) at the same time since an agent can only com-
mit to form one coalition at a time. Note that, instead of
proposing an oﬀer, an agent can choose to remain Ready.A s
shown in Figure 2, it remains Ready even if it has received
an oﬀer. This is important as it allows an agent to receive
multiple oﬀers and merge them to form a bigger coalition
(discussed in Section 4).
Rule 4: Negotiation Termination. Once an agent has
accepted an oﬀer or received an accept, it moves to the Done
state. At this point, it has to send a message to all its peers
from which it has received an oﬀer (and who are, there-
fore, in the Wait state) informing them of the outcome. If
the accepted oﬀer subsumes oﬀers received by neighbouring
agents, it sends an accept to these agents, thereby propa-
gating the accepted oﬀer through the network. To all other
agents, it sends a reject message. By doing so, these agents
are taken out of their Wait state, allowing them to negotiate
with the remaining agents. In addition, to ensure termina-
tion, we assume a deadline after which the agents that have
not reached an agreement each form a singleton coalition.
Given the above rules, we next describe ways to generate
Receive Reject
Receive Counter Oﬀer
Receive Accept Oﬀer
Accept Oﬀer Receive Oﬀer
Reject
Wait Done
Accept Oﬀer
Ready
(Counter) Propose Oﬀer
Figure 2: The negotiation protocol.
meaningful oﬀers. Note that, contrary to most work on CF,
we assume that an agent does not know other agents’ util-
ity functions, nor does it have time to form models of these
functions. Hence, it is diﬃcult for an individual agent to
calculate equilibrium oﬀers. Moreover, given that the com-
putation of stable solutions is usually NP-Hard, we turn to
bargaining heuristics that have typically been applied in bi-
lateral negotiation [7]. Hence, by extending such heuristics
to our DCF protocol, we provide a new framework to analyse
the properties of the DCF process in a practical setting.
4. NEGOTIATIONDECISIONFUNCTIONS
Given the rules from the previous section, an agent can make
a number of decisions. We separate the decision making
into two parts. The negotiation strategies (discussed later
in Section 4.2), determine the share, vi, for any new oﬀers or
counter oﬀers as well as the timing of such oﬀers. Given the
share, the oﬀer generation procedure then chooses whether
to accept an oﬀer or produce a set of (counter) oﬀers, and
which (enhanced) oﬀers to produce or accept. We start with
the latter part, which is largely an optimisation problem that
considers all the choices that respect our protocol.
4.1 Offer Generation Procedure
We let Oi denote the set of current standing oﬀers received
by agent i, i.e., oﬀers that have not been rejected or counter
oﬀered. For convenience, we include the singleton coalitions
which we denote by Oii = {( αi ,V(αi))|αi ∈ Di}. If agent
i has not received any oﬀers from any of its neighbours,
then Oi = Oii.O t h e r w i s e , e a c h o ﬀ e r Oji ⊆O i from an
agent j ∈ N(i) to agent i consists of a number of simple
oﬀers. As we will see, agent j can oﬀer a diﬀerent share
and actions αC for each of agent i’s actions αi ∈ Di (it is
possible to include even more combinations but this makes
the oﬀer impractically large). Therefore, |Oji|≤| Di|.
Now, we can use Rule 1 from section 3.2 to expand the set of
received oﬀers by including all the enhanced oﬀers that can
be obtained by merging two or more oﬀers. When doing so,
agent i can claim any surplus resulting from the merge (while
keeping the share of the other agents the same, as required
by Rule 1). Consider an example where agent 1 receives
O21 = {(αC =  α
1
1,α
3
2 ,v 1 =0 .2),(αC =  α
2
1,α
5
2 ,v 1 =
0.3)} from agent 2, and O31 = {(αC =  α
1
1,α
2
3 ,v 1 =0 .15),(αC =
 α
2
1,α
4
3 ,v 1 =0 .4)} from agent 3. Then, agents 2 and 3
are also committed to the merged oﬀers O
 
21 = {(αC =
 α
1
1,α
3
2,α
2
3 ,v
 
1),(αC =  α
2
1,α
5
2,α
4
3 ,v
  
1)},w h e r ev
 
1 and v
  
1
are maximised subject to the commitments to other agents
in the coalition as set out in Rule 1:
v 
1 = V (α1
1,α 3
2,α 2
3) − (V (α1
1,α 3
2) − 0.2) − (V (α1
1,α 2
3) − 0.15)
v  
1 = V (α2
1,α 5
2,α 4
3) − (V (α2
1,α 5
2) − 0.3) − (V (α2
1,α 4
3) − 0.4)
Note that any received oﬀer may have been merged with
other oﬀers by the sending agent, allowing the possibility
to create large coalitions. We let E denote the expansion
function, and E(Oi) the set of all standing oﬀers including
all enhanced oﬀers.
At this point, agent i has three options. It can either accept
the best (enhanced) oﬀer so far, o
∗ =a r gm a x o∈E(Oi) ui(o),
and receive utility ui(o
∗), counter oﬀer, or produce a new set
of oﬀers to any of its peers j ∈ N(i). The decision depends
on which of these alternatives results in the highest utility.
We now discuss the latter two options in turn.
4.1.1 Generating a Counter Offer
A counter oﬀer is deﬁned here as a standing oﬀer where only
the share claimed by the receiving agent is changed (thus the
coalition and their actions remain the same). An agent i can
choose to counter any of the oﬀers Oji ⊆O i,j ∈ N(i)r e -
ceived. Now, as mentioned earlier, the share is determined
by the negotiation tactic (discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 4.2). Let vi = Ti(Hi,αC,j,v
min
i ,v
max
i ) denote the ne-
gotiation tactic which speciﬁes the share requested by i as
a function of the history Hi of oﬀers and counter oﬀers re-
ceived by agent i (note that, while Oi only consists of the
standing oﬀers, Hi retains any oﬀer made over time), αC
is the proposed coalition (since this is a counter oﬀer, this
is the same coalition as in the original oﬀer), j is the re-
cipient of the oﬀer, and v
min
i ,v
max
i specify the negotiation
range. Speciﬁcally, v
min
i is calculated such that the utility
of the oﬀers is at least equal to the utility it can achieve by
accepting the best standing oﬀer, ui(o
∗). Formally:
v
min
i − β(αC)=ui(o
∗) ⇔ v
min
i = ui(o
∗)+β(αC)( 3 )
Furthermore, v
max
i = V (αC)i st h eb e s ti can hope to get.
Note that, if v
max
i <v
min
i , αC will not be proposed as part
of the counter oﬀer, since no suitable oﬀer can be made.4.1.2 Generating a New Offer
Another option for the agent is to generate a new oﬀer (if
the agent received no oﬀers, then this is the only option
available). To establish which new oﬀer to generate, agent i
computes the best compound oﬀer for each possible neigh-
bour j ∈ N(i), denoted by O
∗
ij. T h i si sd o n ea sf o l l o w s .
First, it calculates the expanded set of oﬀers, excluding any
oﬀers received from agent j, E(Oi\Oji). Recall that this
set contains all possible joined oﬀers, as well as the single-
ton coalition with just agent i. Then, each of these oﬀers is
joined with an action αj ∈ Dj of agent j, and the share to
agent j, vj, is computed using the negotiation tactic from
Section 4.2. A compound oﬀer then consists of the set of
best simple oﬀers, o
∗
ij(αj), one for each action αj ∈ Dj,
excluding any oﬀers that result in a utility below ui(o
∗).
More formally, let o
  = J(αC,α j,v j) deﬁne the merged oﬀer,
where o =( αC,v i),o
  =( αC ,v j), and crucially, αC  =
αC ∪ αj.F u r t h e r m o r e , vj is the share for agent j which
is calculated based on i’s share as follows: let V (αC) − vi
denote the total of shares committed to other agents in the
C. Then, v
max
i = V (αC ) − (V (αC) − vi)i st h em a x i m u m
share that agent i can hope to get from the new coalition
while ˆ vi = Ti(Hi,αC ,j,v
min
i ,v
max
i )i si’s privately known
share as computed by the tactic. Given this, vj = v
max
i −ˆ vi,
is the share for agent j,a n dv
min
i is again calculated using
Equation (3). Then, the best new oﬀer is computed as:
o
∗
ij(αj) = argmax
o =J(αC,αj,vj),o∈E(Oi\Oji)
ˆ ui(o
 )
Furthermore, O
∗
ij is given by: O
∗
ij = {o
∗
ij(αj)|αj ∈ Dj ∧
ui(o
∗
ij(αj)) >u i(o
∗)}.
Note that an important diﬀerence between a counter oﬀer to
j and a new oﬀer, is that the latter removes any coalitional
actions contained in the oﬀer Oji, and replaces this with
a single action by agent j. Therefore, the new oﬀer is not
necessarily better in terms of utility than a counter oﬀer.
4.1.3 Negotiation Decision
Having evaluated the received oﬀers, computed counter of-
fers, and new oﬀers, an agent has to choose among them and
send messages that respect our protocol. Algorithm 1 de-
scribes the steps to do so. Thus, in Step 1, the set of counter
oﬀers is generated based on the received oﬀers (using tactic
Ti) and in steps 2 and 3, the best new oﬀer and counter of-
fer are generated respectively. These are evaluated against
the current best received oﬀer o
∗ in step 4 and if o
∗ has
the highest utility it is accepted, in which case Accept and
Reject messages are sent to all agents involved (step 5) or
not (step 6) in the oﬀer respectively. Otherwise, the agent
may send out a counter oﬀer (step 8) or a new oﬀer (step 10)
depending on which gives it the best utility (step 7). We
next provide the fundamental elements of the negotiation
tactics and overarching strategies that are used to generate
the share of an agent.
4.2 Negotiation Strategies
A negotiation strategy deﬁnes a tactic (i.e., Ti), that deter-
mines the share to be oﬀered, and when an agent should
Algorithm 1 Accepting and Counter-oﬀering.
Require: o
∗,O ji,O
∗
ij∀j ∈ N(i)
1: Ocounter = {(αC,v
 
i) | o =( αC,v i) ∈ Oji,j ∈ N(i)}
where v
 
i = Ti(Hi,αC ,j,v
min
i ,v
max
i ).
2: O
∗
new =a r gm a x O∈{O∗
ij|j∈N(i)}(ˆ ui(O))
3: o
∗
counter =a r gm a x o∈Ocounter(ui(o)).
4: if ui(o
∗) ≥ max(ui(o
∗
counter), ˆ ui(O
∗
new))//accept offer
then
5: send Accept(o
∗)t oa l lj ∈ C,N(i)w h e r eo
∗ =
(αC,v i).
6: send Reject to all k ∈ N(i), where ∃oki ∈ Oji and
k/ ∈ C.
7: else if ui(o
∗
counter) > ˆ ui(O
∗
new) then
8: send Counter(o
∗
counter) to agent j//counter offer.
9: else
10: send Propose(O
∗
new) to agent j //new offer.
11: end if
make the oﬀer.
2 We discuss these in turn. Since our goal
is mainly to establish the baseline performance of our DCF
framework, our tactic is based on well-known tactics in the
automated negotiation literature, in particular [7]. In more
detail, we use a family of exponential functions fθ(r)=
e
θ· r
rmax −1
eθ−1 to determine the concession rate,w h e r er ∈{ 0,1,...,r
max}
is the negotiation round, r
max is the maximum round (af-
ter which no more concession occurs), and θ determines the
slope of the curve. Note that r
max is not a deadline; nego-
tiation can continue, but the agent will no longer concede.
Also note that f(0) = 0 and f(r
max)=1 . G i v e nt h i s ,t h e
share is determined by:
Ti(Hi,αC,j,vmin
i ,vmax
i )=vmin
i +( vmax
i − vmin
i )fθi(r)( 4 )
We consider agents to be conciliatory if θi < 0( a st h i s
induces quick initial concessions), aggressive if θi > 0( a s
this induces slow initial concessions), and passive θi   0( a s
this induces concessions linear in the step size). The impor-
t a n tp o i n tt on o t eh e r ei st h a tw ee x p e c tθi to depend on
an agent’s properties. For example, if an agent is well con-
nected, it is in a good bargaining position and may choose
to set θi > 0.
Now, crucially, round r depends on the current oﬀer made,
the recipient of the oﬀer, and the history of oﬀers, Hi.S p e c i f -
ically, in our framework, whenever an agent i proposes the
same coalition to agent j as before with the same set of ac-
tions, and only the share changes, then that oﬀer goes to
the next round. If, however, a new oﬀer is made which is
not in Hi, then a new counter is created and the round is
set to zero. An agent can also ﬁrst propose a new oﬀer,
and then in the next interaction propose an oﬀer that has
already been made before. In that case, the round for that
oﬀer is retrieved from memory and negotiations continue as
before. Maintaining a counter for each unique oﬀer is im-
portant because, this way, the oﬀer generation procedure will
automatically try diﬀerent types of coalitions. To see this,
note that, as a particular coalition is negotiated for several
rounds, the agent’s utility will decrease (since the agent con-
cedes on that particular coalition), and therefore other op-
tions start to become more attractive. When these options
2More elaborate strategies could be designed (and part of
future work) but we focus on two key features applicable to
the protocol.are exhausted, the agent may decide to go back to a previous
oﬀer until an agreement (or the deadline) is reached.
Having provided baseline tactics, we now discuss when an
agent should make an oﬀer and hence completely deﬁne our
novel negotiation strategies. From the negotiation decision
functions discussed so far, it is clear that an agent can bene-
ﬁt by doing nothing and waiting to receive more oﬀers, since
this gives an agent more options to merge coalitions and re-
ceive a higher payoﬀ. However, if everyone waits, then no
oﬀer is ever made. Therefore, we propose two functions to
decide the timing of oﬀers, the second of which is speciﬁcally
designed for our coalition formation protocol:
• Time-based Strategy(TBS)— an agent makes oﬀers as
soon as the DCF process starts. This is a typical bilateral
negotiation strategy and simulates baseline performance for
tactics that could be implemented in our framework.
• Amortised Strategy (AS)— similar to TBS, but the
agent delays its oﬀers by τi time steps where τi is drawn
from U(1,N(i)). By amortising messages (i.e., staying in the
Ready state), rather than readily making oﬀers (i.e., going
to Wait), agents (with more peers) can expect to receive
more oﬀers from their peers such that more options become
available for merging coalitions to gain a larger share.
We next empirically evaluate TBS and AS on a variety of
networks and determine the key factors that impact on the
size and utility of coalitions that can be formed using our
protocol and decision functions, as well as the eﬃciency of
our strategies in creating such coalitions in a reasonable
time. By so doing, we provide the ﬁrst benchmarks for prac-
tical DCF via automated negotiation.
5. EVALUATION
Our aim here is to validate our approach by showing that
such strategies allow agents to form coalitions eﬃciently and
eﬀectively. Here, eﬃciency is measured by the time taken
to reach agreements while its eﬀectiveness is quantiﬁed by
the social welfare (i.e., aggregate utility) of the system. In
what follows, we describe the experimental setup. Then we
postulate and (in) validate a number of hypotheses with
regards to the mechanism’s and the agents’ performance.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Each agent is randomly attributed between one and ten
actions (i.e., 1 ≤| Di|≤10) and the cost for each ac-
tion αi, βi(αC ∪ αi) is drawn from a uniform distribution
U(10,100)
|C|+1 (to simulate synergies in C). Coalition values are
chosen to mimic decreasing marginal returns from bigger
coalitions on average. The following function is used to
achieve this by choosing parameters p,q ∈ Z
+ and ran-
domly picking μ
α ∈ [1,10] for each set of actions: V (αC)=
e
(p×(1− 1
|C| )q
×

α∈αC U(0,1) × μ
α
i .
We evaluate the performance of our strategies on the follow-
ing networks (similar results were obtained when diﬀerent
parameters were used): (i) Scale free network (SFN) with
100 agents to simulate typical human societies — where the
connectivity of agents follows a power law distribution (the
maximum degree of each agent is limited to 20 and the av-
erage degree is 10), (ii) Random tree (RTN) with 100 agents
with maximum degree 20 and the average degree is 2 to
simulate hierarchical organisations, and (iii) Fully-connected
network (FCN) with 20 agents and the average degree is 19
to simulate a single group. We limit the number of agents
in FCN as the high degree of agents in these graphs re-
sult an exponential growth in the memory requirements and
hence could not be run on a single machine. We experiment
with two homogeneous populations of TBS and AS agents
(as described in the previous section) with θi drawn from
U(−10,10). Furthermore, we set rmax = 10.
The negotiation deadline is set to 100 time steps and at
each time step agents make oﬀers and counter oﬀers to each
other until agreements are reached or the deadline for the
process is met. To evaluate the performance of our nego-
tiation mechanism, we recorded the number of agreements
reached, the time taken to reach such agreements, and the
size of coalitions created. Our experiments are repeated
100 times and the results are averaged and the 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals are provided to indicate the statistical sig-
niﬁcance of the results where needed (equivalent to a t-test
with alpha =0 .05).
5.2 Coalition Formation Efﬁciency
Here we evaluate whether the mechanism allows agents to
rapidly converge to non-singleton coalitions under diﬀerent
settings. We postulate the following hypotheses:
H 1. The higher the average degree of the network, the
bigger the coalitions formed.
H 2. For all networks, AS takes longer to reach agree-
ments than TBS.
The intuition behind our hypotheses is as follows. We note
that, in order to generate large coalitions, RTN and SFN
require agents to form a chain of agreements (see Section 4).
Instead, in FCN, all agents can directly contact all other
agents and exchange oﬀers over larger coalitions than they
can in sparse networks. Moreover, since AS introduces arti-
ﬁcial delays in the negotiation process, we expect AS to be
slower.
Our expectations are partially met by the results (see table
1a) as the average size of coalitions in FCN (5.63) is bigger
than in RTN (4.37) and SFN (3.62) when TBS is used (hence
H1 is partially validated). However, when AS is used, the
maximum coalition size is found in RTN (7.40) followed by
FCN (5.73) and SFN (3.98). We explain the larger coalitions
generated by AS in RTN by the fact that the low average
degree of RTN (2 < 10 < 19 for RTN, SFN, and FCN respec-
tively) suggests a large number of ‘leaf’ nodes which make
oﬀers earlier than their parent nodes who, in turn, merge
received oﬀers to form larger coalitions. The higher degrees
of SFN and FCN instead reduce the likelihood of this eﬀect.
Turning to the time taken (see Table 1b) to reach agreements
(measured in number of rounds of oﬀers), TBS is seen to take
less time (2.67,5.02) than AS (11.32,8.28) in FCN and SFN
respectively while, contrary to our expectations, AS takesless time (5.09) than TBS (10.19) in RTN even though AS
resulted in the biggest coalitions. These results therefore
invalidate H2. On close inspection, this is because, in FCN,
agents can evaluate oﬀers for all other agents in one go (since
each agent has everyone else as a neighbour), but AS intro-
duces some random delays. SFN presents a similar marked
diﬀerence between TBS and AS due to delays incurred by
AS and the fact that the agents cannot contact all other
agents in one go, leading to longer negotiation times than
FCN. In RTN, AS outperforms TBS as parent AS agents
can assemble large coalitions from leaf agents by delaying
their oﬀers while TBS agents tend to propagate oﬀers up
the tree and delay the process signiﬁcantly.
Network TBS AS
SFN 3.62±0.05 3.98±0.06
RTN 4.37±0.37 7.40±0.69
FCN 5.63±0.19 5.73±0.28
(a) Mean size of coalition.
Network TBS AS
SFN 5.02±0.29 8.28±0.21
RTN 10.19±1.235.09±0.76
FCN 2.67±0.29 11.32±0.31
(b) Mean time to agreement.
Table 1: Eﬃciency of CF process.
5.3 Coalition Formation Effectiveness
To compare the average utility AS and TBS obtain in diﬀer-
ent networks on an equal par, we computed an upper bound
on the total utility (i.e.,

C∈S

i∈C ui(C)w h e r eS is a par-
tition of I) of all coalitions in any network using the value
of the grand coalition minus the cost of the cheapest actions
of all agents (i.e., V (αI) −

i∈I minαi∈Di(βi(αi))). This
is to avoid computing the actual optimal coalition structure
to form (and actions chosen) which is an NP-Hard prob-
lem and hence computationally infeasible for 100 agents in
our case. Moreover, we computed the probability of reach-
ing agreements as the ratio number of successful negotiation
outcomes to the total number of negotiations started. We
then postulate the following hypotheses.
H 3. The probability of reaching an agreement is higher
in networks with higher average degree.
H 4. AS always performs better (in utility generated and
probability of reaching agreements) than TBS.
The intuition behind these hypotheses is that in high degree
networks, more coalitions can be explored, hence resulting
in a larger negotiation space with, possibly, higher maxima.
Moreover, since AS agents do actually consider more oﬀers
made to them, they also consider a larger negotiation space
than TBS when choosing to accept. The results shown in ta-
bles 2a and 2b validate these hypotheses as AS outperforms
TBS on all network topologies as the probability of reach-
ing agreements and the utility of these agreements are both
directly correlated with the average degree of the networks.
Network TBS AS
SFN 0.92±0.01 0.93±0.01
RTN 0.49±0.02 0.74±0.02
FCN 0.94±0.01 0.97±0.01
(a) Agreement probability.
Network TBS AS
SFN 0.48±0.01 0.52±0.01
RTN 0.33±0.02 0.43±0.01
FCN 0.56±0.01 0.60±0.02
(b) Scaled average total utility.
Table 2: Eﬀectiveness of the CF process.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a novel framework based on heuristic
negotiation to support practical decentralised coalition for-
mation in social networks. By so doing, we establish a novel
paradigm that addresses the design of DCF protocols and
negotiation decision functions and, hence, departs from pre-
vious algorithmic and economic approaches. Moreover, we
instantiated novel strategies for this framework and empiri-
cally evaluated them over general social networks in order to
establish benchmarks. Thus, we showed how our amortised
strategy outperforms the baseline in terms of the social wel-
fare (by up to 10%) on all networks (trading oﬀ time to reach
agreements) and also showed that the average degree of the
network can signiﬁcantly impact the performance of strate-
gies (lower degrees can improve delay strategies). Future
research will study the analytical properties of the protocol
and improve our negotiation strategies.
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